COMMENTS

A Balanced Approach to Mandamus Review of
Attorney Disqualification Orders
Leah Epsteint

You are general counsel for a company that has been sued for
patent infringement. Given the high-stakes nature of the litigation,
you hire a large and reputable law firm to defend you. On the eve of
trial, the plaintiff files a motion to have your outside counsel disqualified due to an alleged conflict of interest. The district court grants the
motion because your counsel also represents, in an unrelated matter, a
company that is in the process of acquiring the plaintiff. You have two
possible responses: you can hire new counsel and bring them up to
speed at great expense, or you can seek interlocutory appellate review
of the disqualification order. Seeking a writ of mandamus in the court
of appeals is one of the two methods available to you for obtaining

review at this stage,' and whether you prevail will depend in large part
on which standard of review the court of appeals applies in exercising
its mandamus jurisdiction. The above scenario is not far-fetched. Indeed, in recent years, courts have seen an enormous increase in mo-

tions for attorney disqualification.'
t
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The other potential method of review is certification pursuant to 28 USC § 1292(b)
(2000) (allowing for interlocutory review when the district court is "of the opinion that such
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation").
2
For example, a substantially similar case arose in In the Matter of Sandahl, 980 F2d 1118
(7th Cir 1992) involving the law firm then called Mayer, Brown & Platt.
3
According to one survey, in the period from 1986 to 1990, six times more disqualification
motions were reported in federal court opinions than in the period from 1970 to 1975. See Kenneth L. Penegar, The Loss of Innocence: A Brief History of Law Firm Disqualificationin the
Courts, 8 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 831, 889 (1995). This increase cannot be attributed to an
increase in the total number of civil cases filed, which increased only gradually during the relevant period. See id at 890. Penegar also estimates that there are disqualification orders in twothirds of all lawsuits. Id at 832. See also Barry Tarlow, RICO Report: Who Did Your Partners
Represent Before They Met You?, Champion 56,63 (Nov 2003) (noting the increasing frequency
of motions by prosecutors to disqualify defense counsel, and attributing it partially to the fact
that such motions are no longer reviewable until a verdict is rendered); Douglas R. Richmond,
1
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America's largest law firms are growing even larger, in part
through mergers and lateral hiring of attorneys from other firms.
Their clients are likewise expanding and adopting complex organizational structures Potential conflicts of interest arise more frequently
than ever as a result of these changes. Federal courts may disqualify
attorneys from litigation due to violations of state and American Bar
Association (ABA) rules governing professional responsibility' or

violations of standards developed through common law. Such disqualification motions, if successful, not only deny litigants their counsel of
choice, but also result in delays and additional litigation expenses associated with bringing new counsel up to speed. Given the high stakes,
parties frequently appeal the grant or denial of disqualification motions.

In a trilogy of cases heard in the first half of the 1980s (the "Firestone trilogy"), the Supreme Court held that neither orders denying
nor orders granting attorney disqualification motions are final judgments7 and that neither falls within the collateral order exception to
the final judgment rule.8 Therefore, disqualification orders are subject
The Rude Question of Standing in Attorney DisqualificationDisputes,25 Am J Trial Advoc 17,17
(2001) (noting the increasing frequency of attorney disqualification motions).
See Amon Burton, Migratory Lawyers and Imputed Conflicts of Interest, 16 Rev Litig
4
666, 666 (1997) (citing a survey finding that approximately 40 percent of partners at major law
firms are lateral hires, and noting that mergers are occurring at an "increasing rate"). For an
argument that ethics rules should be adjusted to reflect changes in the legal industry, see David
Hricik, Uncertainty, Confusion, and Despair: Ethics and Large-Firm Practice in Texas, 16 Rev
Litig 705, 745 (1997) (advocating changes in ethics laws to provide more "clear answers" when
resolving ethical issues, and arguing that bar associations should be "more proactive").
See Ronald D. Rotunda, Conflicts Problems When Representing Members of Corporate
5
Families, 72 Notre Dame L Rev 655, 681 (1997) (noting that among the benefits of multiple
incorporation is the ability for large companies to "conduct[] business through a series of corporate entities, perhaps with a complex, ever-changing and bewildering organizational chart, using
an impenetrable fog of subsidiaries and affiliates").
See ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2002). The rules as adopted vary from
6
state to state.
The final judgment rule derives from 28 USC § 1291 (2000), which provides the courts of
7
appeals with jurisdiction over appeals from all final decisions of the district courts See also
Lauro Lines SRL v Chasser,490 US 495, 497 (1989) (noting that parties may generally appeal
only from a final judgment); Catlin v United States, 324 US 229,233 (1945) (defining a final judgment as "one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but
execute the judgment").
The Firestonetrilogy consists of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co v Risjord, 449 US 368, 370
8
(1981) (holding that "orders denying motions to disqualify counsel are not appealable final
decisions under § 1291"); Flanaganv United States, 465 US 259,260 (1984) (holding that "a District Court's pretrial disqualification of defense counsel in a criminal prosecution is not immediately appealable" under § 1291); and Richardson-Merrell Inc v Koller, 472 US 424, 426 (1985)
(concluding that "orders disqualifying counsel in a civil case are not collateral orders subject to
immediate appeal").
The collateral order doctrine is a judicially created exception to the final judgment rule. In
creating the collateral order doctrine, the Supreme Court recognized that there is a small class of
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to interlocutory review only if they are certified pursuant to 28 USC
§ 1292(b) or via mandamus. However, while the Supreme Court left
open the possibility that parties subject to disqualification orders can
petition for writs of mandamus in "exceptional circumstances,"' the
Court failed to provide any guidance to help lower courts determine
what qualifies as exceptional. As a result, the circuit courts have taken
divergent approaches to reviewing petitions for mandamus in this

area.

Some circuits apply a strict standard of review to petitions for
mandamus in the attorney disqualification context so that mandamus
review does not become a method for circumventing the prohibition
on interlocutory appeals." Other circuits, however, apply a more relaxed standard that approaches the de novo review applied on direct
orders "which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted
in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Cohen
v
Beneficial IndustrialLoan Corp, 337 US 541,546 (1949). To fall within the collateral order exception, an order must "conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important
issue
completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v Livesay, 437 US 463,468 (1978). The First Circuit
put these requirements more succinctly: "separability, finality, urgency, and importance."
United
States v Alcon Laboratories,636 F2d 876,884 (1st Cir 1981).
In one extraordinary case the Tenth Circuit did allow an appeal under the collateral order
doctrine. See United States v Bolden, 353 F3d 870, 876-78 (10th Cir 2003) (allowing an
appeal
under the collateral order doctrine of a district court's disqualification of an entire U.S. Attorney's
office because "appellate vindication cannot undo such an invasion of Executive authority").
9 See Firestone, 449 US at 378-79 n 13 (leaving open three options for those faced with
disqualification orders: ask the trial court for reconsideration, seek 28 USC § 1292(b) certification, or seek a writ of mandamus "in the exceptional circumstances for which it was designed").
See also Koller, 472 US at 435 (reiterating that § 1292(b) certification and mandamus are
still
available for parties seeking review of disqualification orders). Note that petitions for writs
of
mandamus are not technically appeals but rather are original actions brought in the appellate
court. See, for example, Cotler v Inter-County OrthopaedicAssociation, 530 F2d 536, 538 (3d
Cir
1976) (holding that because the appellate court exercises mandamus jurisdiction as an original
act of law, litigation costs for a mandamus proceeding may accordingly be "assessed in
favor of
the prevailing party in such an action at law as in any other"). The Koller Court also suggests,
somewhat implausibly, that disqualified attorneys whose reputations have been injured may
seek
"relief from the Circuit Judicial Council pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1)."
472 US at 435. However, rather than reviewing district court judgments for error, the Council is charged with
providing "an administrative remedy for misconduct of a judge for which no judicial remedy is
available." In re Charge of JudicialMisconduct,595 F2d 517,517 (9th Cir 1979). As such, even a
gross
error will not be remedied by the Council so long as the error does not derive from actual
misconduct.
10 Koller,472 US at 435, citing Firestone,449 US at 378-79.
11 See, for example, Sandahl,980 F2d at 1121 ("To avoid the collapse of mandamus into an
appeal ... a litigant who seeks mandamus to set aside an order of disqualification must show
that
the order is patently erroneous2"); In re Mechem, 880 F2d 872, 874 (6th Cir 1989) (determining
that findings of fact in a disqualification order are subject to a "clearly erroneous" standard
of
review); In re Bushkin Associates Inc, 864 F2d 241, 245 (1st Cir 1989) (suggesting that "mandamus does not lie to control run-of-mine misuses of judicial discretion").
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appeal so that they might shape the substantive law of attorney disqualification.'2
This Comment argues that neither the very strict standard nor the
de novo standard comports with Supreme Court precedent. A standard for mandamus that is virtually impossible to meet renders meaningless the Supreme Court's preservation of this avenue for relief. A
de novo standard, on the other hand, ignores the Court's directive that
mandamus be reserved for the "exceptional circumstances for which it
was designed."" In contrast, a balanced approach to mandamus review
of disqualification orders -one that combines a high threshold showing of a clear right to mandamus relief with a more flexible understanding of irreparable harm-has advantages over both of the above
approaches in terms of efficiency and justice, especially when combined with mechanisms that assure greater uniformity and predictability in the law of attorney disqualification. This balanced approach
dovetails nicely with that taken by the Seventh Circuit and comports
with the pragmatic underpinnings of the Firestone trilogy. However,
the balanced approach constitutes an improvement over existing approaches in that it distinguishes between orders granting and orders
denying disqualification motions when assessing whether a party faces
irreparable harm.
Part I of this Comment provides a broad overview of the substantive law of attorney disqualification and an introduction to the writ of
mandamus. This Part also discusses the Supreme Court's pronouncements in this area and describes the trends leading up to the Firestone
trilogy. Part II compares the divergent approaches taken by the courts
of appeals in the wake of the Firestone trilogy." Finally, Part III adSee, for example, In re American Airlines, Inc,972 F2d 605,609 (5th Cir 1992) (holding
that a district court's application of ethical standards in a disqualification order is subject to de
novo review); In re DresserIndustries,Inc, 972 F2d 540, 543 (5th Cir 1992) (holding that where
the
"disqualification is based on a state's disciplinary rules, a court of appeals should consider
district court's interpretation of the state disciplinary rules as an interpretation of law, subject
essentially to de novo consideration"); Christensen v United States District Court for the Central
District of California, 844 F2d 694 (9th Cir 1988) (vacating a district court judgment without
granting it any deference and thus reviewing the applicable law on disqualification orders under an
12

effectively de novo standard).
13 Firestone,449 US at 379 n 13.
Disquali14 This Comment focuses on attorney disqualification orders in the civil context.
examFor
cases.
civil
in
those
from
issues
different
very
present
cases
fication orders in criminal
ple, unlike those appealing a disqualification order after final judgment in a civil suit, a petitioner
who was wrongly denied his counsel of choice in a criminal case need not show that he was
prejudiced by this denial. See Flanagan,465 US at 267-68 (noting that "prejudice to the defense
is presumed" in such circumstances). Moreover, the Court has indicated that the justifications for
the finality requirement are particularly strong in criminal cases due to the various interests in
seeing a speedy resolution to the trial. See id at 264-65, citing United States v Hollywood Motor
are
Car Co, 458 US 263,265 (1982) (noting that policy considerations against piecemeal litigation
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vances a balanced approach to mandamus review of attorney disqualification orders and attempts to reconcile it with Supreme Court
precedent. Part III also proposes methods by which greater uniformity
can be achieved in the substantive law of attorney disqualification
while maintaining a relatively demanding standard for the issuance of
mandamus.
I. BACKGROUND

A.

Substantive Law of Attorney Disqualification

Every court has the inherent power to supervise the conduct of
attorneys appearing before it." Indeed, many courts see this supervision as their duty to the public." While federal law ultimately governs
the conduct of attorneys in federal court," courts are guided by a
number of ethical standards, including "case law, applicable court
rules, and 'the lore of the profession,' as embodied in codes of professional conduct.'"" Chief among these codes is the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (the "Model Rules") and its predecessor, the
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility.'9 The Model Rules,
as adopted by state supreme courts, are the primary source of ethical
standards in federal courts. However, even these rules are not binding
on the federal courts. °
"strongest in the field of criminal law") and Cobbledick v United States, 309 US 323,
325 (1940)
(stating that such judicial efficiency considerations are "especially compelling in the administration of criminal justice").
15 See Ex parte Burr, 22 US (9 Wheat) 529, 531 (1824) (stating that the power to suspend
an attorney is "incidental to all Courts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and for
the respectability of the profession"). See also Chambers v NASCO, Inc, 501 US 32, 46 (1991)
(discussing the implied powers of courts to control the conduct of attorneys appearing before
them); Ramsay v Boeing Welfare Benefit Plans Committee, 662 F Supp 968, 969 (D Kan 1987)
(noting that the court's broad power to disqualify attorneys is inherent in its "general supervisory authority").
16 See, for example, In re Cendant Corp, 260 F3d 183, 199 (3d Cir 2001) (explaining that
courts are empowered to regulate the attorneys that appear before them in order to "preserve
the integrity of the judicial process").
17 See In re Snyder,472 US 634,645 n 6 (1985).
18

Idat645.

19 See ABA Model Rules (cited in note 6). The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated in 1969 and subsequently adopted by the majority of federal jurisdictions. See Tannahill v United States, 25 C Ct 149, 161 n 23 (1992) (noting that, prior to the adoption of the Model Rules, the majority of states and federal jurisdictions had adopted the Model
Code). The Model Rules replaced the Model Code in 1983 and have since been adopted in every
state but California, which has its own code of professional conduct. See Richard E. Flamm,
Lawyer Disqualification:Conflicts of Interest and Other Bases § 1.1 at 5-6 (Banks & Jordan
2003).
20
See Judith A. McMorrow and Daniel R. Coquillette, Moore's FederalPractice: The Federal
Law of Attorney Conduct § 807.02 at 807-13 (Matthew Bender 3d ed 2001) (describing the common law nature of attorney disqualification and the "scant attention" given by courts to local rules).
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The Model Rules were designed to be a guide to ethical behavior
for use in disciplinary proceedings, not for attorney disqualification."
Even where courts do identify violations of ethical rules, these do not
command disqualification, which is considered an extreme remedy."
Cases raising issues of attorney conduct most frequently involve
conflicts of interest.? These conflicts of interest can be between an
attorney and his current client (frequently arising in cases of multiple
representations)' or between an attorney and his former client (to
whom the attorney continues to owe a duty of loyalty). Of course,
other types of ethics violations, such as contacting jurors or offering
monetary inducements to expert witnesses prior to their testimony,
may also yield disqualification orders.

26

20 (cited in note 6). See also David Hricik and Jae Ellis,
21 See ABA Model Rules, Scope
Disparitiesin Legal Ethical Standards Between State and FederalJudicial Systems: An Analysis
and a Critique, 13 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 577, 577 (2000) (noting the "curious fact that
courts rely on standards that expressly apply only in disciplinary proceedings in deciding nondisciplinary issues, such as disqualification motions").
22
See, for example, Duncan v Merrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, 646 F2d 1020, 1025
n 6 (5th Cir 1981) (noting, in the context of class actions, that disqualification is "an extreme
remedy that will not be imposed lightly"), revd on other grounds, Gibbs v Paluk, 742 F2d 181,
185 (5th Cir 1984). See also Herr v Union Local 306,943 F Supp 292,294 (SD NY 1996) (holding
that ethical standards should not be "mechanically applied when disqualification is raised in
litigation"); Armstrong v McAlpin, 625 F2d 433,444 (2d Cir 1980) ("Weighing the needs of efficient judicial administration against the potential advantage of immediate preventive measures,
we believe that unless an attorney's conduct tends to 'taint the underlying trial' ... courts should
be quite hesitant to disqualify an attorney."), vacd on other grounds, McAlpin v Armstrong, 449
US 1106 (1981).
23
See Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation:The Judicial Role, 65 Fordham L
Rev 71, 71 n 4 (1996) (citing a study by Daniel Coquillette finding that "out of 443 reported
federal decisions involving attorney conduct over a five-year period, 46% involved conflict-ofinterest rules and an additional 10% involved the attorney-witness disqualification rules, which
many regard as conflict-of-interest rules").
See, for example, Smiley v Director,Office of Workers Compensation Programs,984 F2d
24
278, 282 (9th Cir 1993) (analyzing conflicts created by multiple representations and finding an
attorney's "dual representation" of adverse interests to be sufficient grounds for disqualification
where "consent was lacking"); In re Freedom Solar Center, Inc, 776 F2d 14, 15 (1st Cir 1985)
(holding that a "debtor's counsel may not also represent the debtor's sole shareholder when that
sole shareholder is attempting to purchase some of the debtor's assets and may be liable for
preferential transfers"); International Electronics Corp v Flanzer, 527 F2d 1288, 1296 (2d Cir
1975) (finding conflict of interest considerations present in civil litigation "where one of the
defendants was formerly a member of the law firm which represented all the defendants in a
transaction that is the subject of [the] suit" and directing the trial judge to explore "adequately"
whether a conflict of interest was present).
25 See, for example, Mannhalt v Reed, 847 F2d 576,580 (9th Cir 1988) (noting that conflicts
arise where a lawyer is forced to divide his loyalty between a present and past client).
26 For example, attorneys have been disqualified for contacting a represented party without the permission of his lawyer, see Faison v Thornton, 863 F Supp 1204, 1207 (D Nev 1993);
contacting jurors, Bushkin Associates Inc v Raytheon Co, 121 FRD 5,8 (D Mass 1988); and offering opposing counsel's expert witness a monetary inducement prior to his testifying, Erickson v
Newmar Corp,87 F3d 298,303-04 (9th Cir 1996).
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The multiplicity of sources forming the substantive law of attorney disqualification contributes significantly to the inconsistency
among federal courts in the application of this body of law. In addition, some of the divergence can surely be attributed to the diversity
of views in the legal community regarding the broader purposes of
attorney disqualification. While some commentators criticize disqualification as frequently unnecessary27 and subject to abuse by litigants
jockeying for strategic advantage,n others suggest that the practice can
control dangerous conflicts of interest and promote public confidence
in the judicial system. 29 In any event, these characteristics of attorney
disqualification law render all the more acute the effects on the bar of
an absence of interlocutory review of these orders. The lack of uni-

formity in how this law is applied results, in part, from this absence of
top-down control.
B.

The Pre-FirestoneLandscape and the FirestoneTrilogy
Motions to disqualify counsel were relatively infrequent until the

1970s.n The substantial increase in such motions since then reflects
significant change in the legal industry's structure. Law firms grew,

27 See, for example, Jonathan J. Lerner, Honoring Choice by Consenting Adults: Prospective
Conflict Waivers as a Mature Solution to Ethical Gamesmanship-A Response to Mr. Fox, 29
Hofstra L Rev 971, 973-74 (2001) (arguing that sophisticated parties should be trusted to enter
into prospective conflicts waiver agreements with their attorneys). See also David B. Wilkins,
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv L Rev 799,882 (1992) (discussing the efficacy of various mechanisms, including the market, disciplinary bodies, and civil liability, in regulating attorney conflicts of interest).
28
For example, Susan Shapiro describes a number of ways in which corporations can use
the law of attorney disqualification to their advantage:
They give business-any kind of business-to a law firm known to orchestrate hostile
takeovers so that their company will not be a takeover target of that firm. Or perhaps a
company is secretly planning to sue another company. But, first, for strategic advantage, it
gives some business to the law firm that typically handles that company's litigation, or to
the best local litigation firms, thereby increasing its adversary's defense costs and restricting
its access to legal talent.
Susan P Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in the Practiceof Law
and Real Life,28 L & Soc Inquiry 87,110 (2003).
29
See, for example, Orrin G. Judd, Conflicts of Interest-A TrialJudge's Notes, 44 Fordham
L Rev 1097, 1112 (1976) ("[N]o judge properly can disregard this responsibility [to disqualify
attorneys] to enforce respect for the judicial process where the very integrity of that process is
threatened by an attorney's conflict of interest."). See also Brown v Eighth Judicial District
Court, 116 Nev 1200, 14 P3d 1266, 1269 n 4 (2000) ("[Djisqualification may be warranted if an
appearance of unfairness or impropriety is great enough to undermine public trust and confidence in the judicial system."); Lovell v Winchester, 941 SW2d 466, 469 (Ky 1997) (holding that
the appearance of impropriety justifies attorney disqualification because it "promotes the public's confidence in the integrity of the legal profession").
30
See Penegar, 8 Georgetown J Legal Ethics at 832 (cited in note 3).
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often through mergers and lateral hiring.' At the same time, clients
that had previously relied on a single firm for outside counsel began
to spread their legal work across multiple firms.32 In addition, federal
dockets expanded in size, and the nature of that growth made disqualification more likely; there was a disproportionate increase in
large and complex business litigation, which is likely to involve several
parties who are in turn likely to be repeat purchasers of legal services. 33
These changes in the legal industry increased not only the likeli-

hood of actual conflicts but also opportunities to gain strategic advantage in litigation through the use of disqualification motions. In many
cases, parties would file strategic motions to disqualify opposing counsel, and if denied, appeals under the collateral order doctrine. Thus,
they would delay the litigation, waste their opponents' resources, and
potentially deny them their choice of counsel.m
The frequency with which the circuit courts faced appeals from
disqualification orders in the period leading up to the Firestonetrilogy
resulted from the fact that many circuits allowed parties to appeal
3
these orders as of right under the collateral order doctrine. In addition, as noted above, permitting appeals as of right allowed litigants to
use disqualification orders to gain strategic advantage. In fact, in the
period leading up to Firestone,the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, both of

which had previously allowed appeals under the collateral order doctrine, changed course in response to concerns that the motions and
appeals were "disguised harassment." It is against this backdrop that
See Ted Schneyer, Nostalgia in the Fifth Circuit. Holding the Line on Litigation Conflicts
Through FederalCommon Law, 16 Rev Litig 537,542 (1997).
32 Id at 542-43. Of course, the existence of these conflicts rules is one reason why companies use multiple law firms.
33
Id.
34 See, for example, Allegaert v Perot, 565 F2d 246, 251 (2d Cir 1977) (expressing concern
over the purely tactical use of disqualification motions); Woods v Covington County Bank, 537
F2d 804, 813 (5th Cir 1976) (noting that attorneys "now commonly use disqualification motions
for purely strategic purposes").
35 The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits all allowed interlocutory appeal of
denials of disqualification orders under the collateral order doctrine in the pre-Firestoneperiod.
The First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits did not. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co
v Risjord,449 US 368,373 n 10 (1981) (outlining the circuit split).
Moreover, the pre-Firestone circuit split over whether to allow interlocutory appeal as of
right under the collateral order doctrine roughly correlates with the current divide over the
appropriate standard for mandamus relief in the attorney disqualification context. Accordingly,
one might conclude that the real disagreement among the circuits is not over the narrow question of which standard to apply in reviewing petitions for mandamus in this context but rather
the broader question of whether interlocutory review of attorney disqualification orders is a
good idea at all.
36
Melamed v ITT ContinentalBaking Co, 592 F2d 290,295 (6th Cir 1979) (observing that
disqualification motions "can easily be simply 'disguised harassment') (internal citation omit31
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the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area should be interpreted."
Although the Firestone trilogy primarily employs doctrinal arguments
in holding that attorney disqualification orders are not appealable
under the collateral order doctrine, the Court appears to have been
motivated, at least in part, by very pragmatic policy considerations.'
In the first of the Firestone trilogy, FirestoneTire & Rubber Co v
Risjord,' the Court held that orders denying disqualification motions
were not subject to immediate review under the collateral order
doctrine.40 The Firestone Court explicitly left open the question of
whether orders grantingdisqualification were immediately appealable.
In two subsequent decisions, Flanagan v United States" and Richardson-MerrellInc v Koller,2 the Court held that these too did not qualify
for appeal under the collateral order doctrine.
While the Court closed off the collateral order route to interlocutory review of attorney disqualification orders, it did allow that in a
narrow range of cases parties may seek mandamus relief at an interlocutory stage.4' The standards for mandamus vary across circuits and
legal contexts, but two important requirements can be derived from
ted), revd, Firestone,449 US at 380 n 15. See also In re Multi-Piece Rim ProductsLiability Litigation, 612 F2d 377, 378 (8th Cir 1980) (agreeing with the Sixth Circuit's rationale on "disguised
harassment" and holding, prospectively, that orders denying disqualification were no longer
appealable under the collateral order doctrine, though continuing to recognize that orders granting such motions were appealable), vacd and remd, Firestone,449 US at 370.
37 Although the Supreme Court vacated Koller on jurisdictional grounds, the Court acknowledged the D.C. Circuit's concerns regarding the tactical use of disqualification motions. See
Koller v Richardson-MerrellInc, 737 F2d 1038, 1051 (DC Cir 1984) (noting that the "tactical use
of motions to disqualify counsel" had "become so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as
to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary"), vacd and remd, 472 US 424,436 (1985)
("[W]e share the Court of Appeals' concern about 'tactical use of disqualification motions' to
harass opposing counsel.").
38 See Koller, 472 US at 434, citing Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H.
Cooper, 15 FederalPracticeand Procedure § 3907 at 433 (West 1976) (noting that "[miost pretrial orders of district judges are ultimately affirmed" and rejecting the suggestion that "the delay
resulting from the occasionally erroneous disqualification outweighs the delay that would result
from allowing piecemeal appeal of every order disqualifying counsel").
39 449 US 368 (1981).
40

Idat375.

465 US 259 (1984) (holding that orders disqualifying counsel in the criminal context
were not appealable under the collateral order doctrine).
42
472 US 424 (1985). A circuit split emerged after Flanagan over the appealability of
orders granting disqualification in the civil context. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits relied on
Flanaganin holding that such orders were not so reviewable, while the Second, Eleventh, Federal, and D.C. Circuits distinguished Flanaganand allowed such appeals in civil cases. Koller, 472
US at 432. The Koller Court held that orders disqualifying counsel in the civil context were unreviewable under the collateral order doctrine. Id at 426.
43 Firestone, 449 US at 379 n 13 (indicating that "in the exceptional circumstances for
which it was designed, a writ of mandamus from the court of appeals might be available"). See
also Koller, 472 US at 435 (confirming that mandamus is still available in exceptional circumstances to parties subject to disqualification motions).
41
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Supreme Court precedent: a petitioner must demonstrate irreparable

harm and a clear right to relief." In determining under what circumstances the Court intended that mandamus be available to litigants,
some insights can be drawn from the Court's collateral order doctrine
decisions.
The Firestone Court held that while denial of a disqualification

motion does satisfy the first prong of the collateral order doctrine,5
and assumed without deciding that such orders satisfy the second
prong," such an order is not "effectively unreviewable" from a final
judgment and so fails the last prong of the test. 7 In so holding, the
Court rejected as insufficient the petitioner's claim that it might be
irreparably harmed by "the possibility that the course of the proceed-

ings may be indelibly stamped or shaped with the fruits of a breach of
confidence or by acts or omissions prompted by a divided loyalty."'
This suggests that such concerns will not satisfy the irreparable harm
requirement for obtaining mandamus relief, either. However, the
Court's opinion leaves open the possibility that such orders may yet
be irreparable under the right circumstances." Unfortunately, the circumstances that may justify interlocutory relief are left to the imaginations of the lower court judges."'
44 See Mallardv United States District Court for the Southern Districtof Iowa, 490 US 296,
309 (1989) (enumerating the mandamus requirements as (1) the lack of "adequate alternative
means" and (2) a "clear and indisputable" right to issuance); Allied Chemical Corp v Daiflon,
Inc, 449 US 33, 35 (1980) (articulating the mandamus requirements in similar language); Bankers
Life & Casualty Co v Holland, 346 US 379,384 (1953) (holding that mandamus was inappropriate where "it [was] not clear that adequate remedy [could not] be afforded petitioner in due
course" and the petitioner had not "met the burden of showing that its right to issuance of the
writ [was] 'clear and indisputable"').
45
Firestone, 449 US at 375 (holding that such an order "conclusively determine[s] the
disputed question"). Note, however, that Justice Rehnquist would have held that the denial of a
motion to disqualify does not satisfy this first prong because a district court judge can reconsider
at any time and order the disqualification. Id at 381 (Rehnquist concurring).
46 Id at 376 (majority) (assuming without deciding that the question is "completely separate from the merits of the action").
47 Id at 377:

The decision whether to disqualify an attorney ordinarily turns on the peculiar factual
situation of the case then at hand, and the order embodying such a decision will rarely, if
ever, represent a final rejection of a claim of fundamental right that cannot effectively be
reviewed following judgment on the merits.
48
Id at 376, quoting Brief for Petitioner, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co v Risjord, No 79-1420,
*15 (SCt filed July 18,1980) (available at 1980 WL 339807).
49 Firestone,449 US at 378-79 n 13.
50
While the Supreme Court failed to explicitly specify the circumstances in which mandamus relief should be available to redress erroneous disqualification orders, Judge Michael
McConnell's student comment is somewhat illuminating in this regard. See Michael McConnell,
Comment, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualificationof Counsel in the
Federal Courts, 45 U Chi L Rev 450, 472-80 (1978) (noting that a review of Supreme Court
jurisprudence "yields certain doctrinal principles with which to evaluate the appropriateness of
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Similarly, the Koller Court indicates that although a petitioner
might suffer substantial delay in getting the relief he seeks if he is
forced to change counsel, this does not render a disqualification order
appropriate for interlocutory review under the collateral order doctrine. " The Court also rejected the argument that the delays caused by
"injudicious use of disqualification motions" justify allowing interlocutory appeals from disqualification orders." Likewise, the Court was
not persuaded by the argument that attorneys suffer a harm from disqualification that would go without redress in the absence of interlocutory review:53 the Court held that "[a]s a matter of professional
ethics," only the client's needs should govern the decision of whether

and when to appeal." In addition, the Court held that increased litigation expenses are "not sufficient to set aside the finality requirement
imposed by Congress."" Finally, the Court was unconvinced by the
broader policy concern over the tactical use of disqualification orders

by litigants, concluding that the trial courts can more effectively police
the parties. 5 The Court's holdings that the above effects do not render
a disqualification order effectively unreviewable may also suggest that

these effects do not satisfy the irreparable harm requirement for
using the writ to review disqualification denials"). Both the Sixth and Eighth Circuits relied upon
McConnell's analysis in their discussions of the avenues for interlocutory review left open after
the collateral order path was closed. See Multi-PieceRim Products,612 F2d at 378; Melamed, 592
F2d at 295.The Firestone Court did the same. See 449 US at 378 n 13. McConnell recognized that
"[slome mechanism must be available ... to review a blatantly incorrect order where special
circumstances make the consequences to the party unusually harsh." McConnell, Comment, 45 U
Chi L Rev at 464. The fact that the Supreme Court cited ten pages of McConnell's comment
when it discussed mandamus may suggest that the Court had similar reasons for retaining a
narrow mandamus remedy while eliminating interlocutory appeals as of right. The nature and
degree of burdens that satisfy the irreparable harm requirement for mandamus relief should be
analyzed accordingly.
51 Koller, 472 US at 434.
52
Id.
53 If the client prevails with new counsel or settles the suit, an erroneous disqualification
order is rendered moot, and if the client loses, he may nevertheless be unable to demonstrate
prejudice.
54 Koller, 472 US at 434-35, citing ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7(b), 2.1
(1985).
55 Koller, 472 US at 436.
56 Id (responding to the D.C. Circuit's analysis that failing to review disqualification orders
at the interlocutory stage raises the stakes in a world where parties use these orders to gain
strategic advantage). Indeed, district courts have occasionally imposed sanctions pursuant to
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to discourage the abusive use of disqualification
motions. See Penegar, 8 Georgetown J Legal Ethics at 858 (cited in note 3) ("Rule 11 sanctions
have begun to be imposed on lawyers who file (or resist) ... [disqualification] motions without
sufficient factual basis or for improper purposes."). See also Optyl Eyewear Fashion International
Corp v Style Cos, 760 F2d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir 1985) (affirming a district court's imposition of
sanctions on an attorney who brought a meritless disqualification motion solely for tactical
reasons and in bad faith). Nevertheless, policing by district courts works only when those courts
do not themselves err. Adding another layer of review could potentially reduce error costs.
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mandamus relief." However, the fact that the Court once again explicitly left open mandamus as a path for interlocutory review suggests
that it acknowledged that in some circumstances the burdens placed
on parties due to the disqualification of their counsel will be so great
as to qualify as irreparable harm. Therefore, even if disqualification of
one's counsel of choice is not de facto irreparable harm on its own,
when combined with a very great burden in terms of litigation costs
and delay it may be.
C.

Mandamus Generally

In circumstances in which other forms of interlocutory review, including review under the collateral order doctrine, are unavailable,
parties may petition for writs of mandamus." Although litigants have
used the writ for many purposes in its long history," it is now best understood as akin to an interlocutory appeal, a means to procure interlocutory review of a district court order.6w The writ offers relief in those
"instances where rigid enforcement of the final judgment rule would
result in injustice. '
The writ is regarded as a "drastic" remedy, "to be invoked only in
extraordinary situations." 62 Mandamus is reserved for those instances
57 Another way to reconcile the Court's holding that these effects do not render an order
effectively unreviewable with its reservation of mandamus is to suggest that the "effectively
unreviewable" standard in the collateral order context is not identical to the "irreparable harm"
standard in the mandamus context. At least some courts suggest that the irreparable harm requirement for mandamus relief tracks the "effectively unreviewable" prong of the collateral
order doctrine. See In re Papandreou,139 F3d 247, 250 (DC Cir 1998) (reasoning that "mandamus's 'no other adequate means' requirement tracks Cohen's bar on issues effectively reviewable
on ordinary appeal"). See note 8. This need not be the case, however, and it is entirely plausible,
given the paucity of cases in which the collateral order doctrine has been found to apply, that the
requirement of irreparable harm for mandamus is less demanding. Of course, the dearth of collateral order doctrine cases can be explained on other grounds (that is, the separability requirement might be as effective a roadblock to jurisdiction under the collateral order exception).
Analyzing the differences between the "effectively unreviewable" requirement and the "irreparable harm" requirement would necessitate looking well beyond the attorney disqualification
context. As such, this suggestion is beyond the scope of this Comment.
58
The federal courts derive jurisdiction to consider petitions for mandamus from the All
Writs Act, 62 Stat 944 (1948), codified at 28 USC § 1651(a) (2000) ("The Supreme Court and all
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.").
59
See, for example, Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137,139 (1803) (holding that the
appropriate remedy would be a writ of mandamus compelling delivery of the commission).
60 See, for example, Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 US 578, 583 (1943) (indicating that the
writs have traditionally been used "to exert the revisory appellate power over the inferior
court").
61 In re American Medical Systems Inc, 75 F3d 1069,1077 (6th Cir 1996).
Allied Chemical Corp v Daiflon, Inc,449 US 33,34 (1980). See also Ex parte Fahey, 332
62
US 258,260 (1947) ("As extraordinary remedies, [writs of mandamus, prohibition, and injunction
against judges] are reserved for really extraordinary causes."). Some courts suggest that this is so
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of "clear abuse of discretion or 'usurpation of judicial power" ' ' and
where the petitioner has satisfied the "burden of showing that [his]
right to issuance of the writ is 'clear and indisputable."'' ' 4 Furthermore,
exist.
mandamus is available only where no adequate alternatives
Whereas under the collateral order doctrine the challenge for parties
seeking interlocutory relief is jurisdictional, the challenge with manit exceeddamus is actually qualifying for relief: the Court has made writ.
6
the
of
issuance
for
requirements
the
satisfy
to
ingly difficult
The courts of appeals have operationalized the Supreme Court's
directives in different ways. While the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have
adopted multifactor balancing tests, 7 the Seventh Circuit considers
only whether a petitioner has a clear and indisputable right to relief
and whether the petitioner faces irreparable harm. The various approaches utilized by the circuit courts and the conflicting standards
employed by some of the circuits point to the highly discretionary nature of mandamus relief.8 Moreover, courts operationalize the mandamus standard differently depending on the legal context.° This exbecause a petition for a writ of mandamus has "the unfortunate consequence of making the
judge a litigant." Id at 260. However, all appeals effectively make the district court an interested
party in some sense, so it is not clear that this explains why mandamus is special.
Holland,346 US at 383.
63
64

Idat384.

See, for example, Kerr v United States District Court,426 US 394,403 (1976).
66 See, for example, Allied Chemical,449 US at 36 (illustrating with a Gilbert & Sullivan
line that writs of mandamus are to be issued only in rare, exceptional circumstances: "What
never? Well, hardly ever!").
The Sixth Circuit, for example, considers whether (1) the petitioner "has no other ade67
quate means ... to attain the relief desired"; (2) "It]he petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced
in a way not correctable on appeal"; (3) "[tlhe district court's order is clearly erroneous as a
matter of law"; (4) "[t]he district court's order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent
disregard of the federal rules"; and (5) "[t]he district court's order raises new and important
65

problems, or issues of law of first impression." In re Bendectin ProductsLiability Litigation, 749

F2d 300,304 (6th Cir 1984) (noting that these are guidelines that are to be balanced against each
other, not requirements that must each be met). This mirrors the Ninth Circuit's guidelines. See
Bauman v United States District Court,557 F2d 650,654-55 (9th Cir 1977). Note that factors (1)

and (2) are closely related, if not identical. Also note that while factor (3) appears to conflict with
factor (4) and factor (4) appears to conflict with factor (5), these conflicts are not fatal given that
these factors are guidelines that need not all be met.
68 See, for example, In re Barnett,97 F3d 181, 183-84 (7th Cir 1996) (stating that a disqualification order could be challenged with mandamus where the petitioner shows both "irreparable
harm" and a "clear right to relief').
69

See Steven Wisotsky, ExtraordinaryWrits: "Appeal" by Other Means, 26 Am J Trial Ad-

voc 577, 582-83 (2003) (suggesting that "writ usage is governed by soft situational discretion"
resulting in a jurisprudence that is a "legal realist's paradise").
70
For example, cases involving mandamus review of decisions to allow or disallow jury
trials are considered special and therefore not analogous. See Nathan A. Forrester, Comment,
Mandamus as a Remedy for the Denial ofJury Trial, 58 U Chi L Rev 769,778 (1991) (explaining

that the irreparable harm requirement is softened for this category of cases). For a discussion of
mandamus review in the judge recusal context, see Wisotsky, 26 Am J Trial Advoc at 584-85
(cited in note 69).
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plains why the courts struggle to arrive at an appropriate standard for
mandamus relief in the somewhat unique attorney disqualification
context.
Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit formulates the requirement that
the petitioner have a clear and indisputable right to relief as a requirement that the order be clearly erroneous as a matter of law.
While clearly erroneous is a standard ordinarily associated with findings of fact, it effectively conveys the more demanding nature of mandamus review for errors of law; this is not the de novo standard applied on review in other circumstances. Likewise, ordinary abuse of
discretion will not justify mandamus relief when that is the applicable
standard.
II. DIVERGENT APPROACHES AMONG THE CIRCUITS

A. Circuits That Relax the Standard
Although the Supreme Court indicates that the mandamus exception to the prohibition of interlocutory appeal of disqualification
orders is quite narrow," some circuits have seized upon this avenue
and expanded its availability. For example, while many courts interpret the traditional mandamus requirement that a petitioner demonstrate his "clear" or even "clear and indisputable" right to relief to

require a finding of something akin to "clear error" but with respect to
questions of law,72 the Fifth Circuit has interpreted this requirement
such that they may review a "district court's interpretation of... disciplinary rules as 3an interpretation of law, subject essentially to de novo
consideration."

This approach allows the Fifth Circuit to require that district
courts apply its preferred substantive law of attorney disqualification.
For example, the Dresser court utilized a de novo standard of review
to hold that national conflict of interest standards apply in the Fifth
71 Firestone,449 US at 378-79 n 13.
72
See, for example, In re Bushkin Associates; Inc, 864 F2d 241,245 (1st Cir 1989) (explaining that the legal question at issue was "at least fairly debatable" and that generally, "a showing
of legal error sufficient to win reversal on direct appeal, without more, does not warrant resort to
mandamus"). The First Circuit added that the decision to disqualify an attorney once a violation
is found is essentially a discretionary one and that "mandamus is generally thought an inappropriate prism through which to inspect exercises of judicial discretion." Id.
73 In re Dresser Industries; Inc, 972 F2d 540, 543 (5th Cir 1992) (indicating that a court will
interpret ethics rules as it would any other source of law because "district courts enjoy no particular advantage over appellate courts in formulating ethical rules to govern motions to disqualify"), citing Woods v Covington County Bank, 537 F2d 804,810 (5th Cir 1976), and Unified Sewerage Agency v Jelco Inc,646 F2d 1339, 1342 n 1 (9th Cir 1981). Likewise, precedent in the Fifth
Circuit suggests that "a district court's ruling upon a disqualification motion is not a matter of
discretion." In re American Airlines, Inc,972 F2d 605,609 (5th Cir 1992).
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Circuit." Likewise, in In re American Airlines, Inc," the Fifth Circuit

held that "little or no deference is proper in reviewing [the district
court's] interpretation of ethical rules."'"
As to the second requirement for mandamus, that the ruling will
cause the petitioner some irreparable harm in the absence of interlocutory relief, the Fifth Circuit has concluded that the Court has not
foreclosed the possibility that a very substantial delay or increase in
litigation costs might justify mandamus relief." It has also considered
the broader precedential import of a case as impacting the decision to
grant mandamus relief." Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held in Christensen v United States DistrictCourtfor the Central Districtof California9
that the petitioner's inability to be represented at trial by the counsel
of his choice was irreparable in that this harm could not be redressed
on appeal from final judgment."

More troubling from the perspective of one interested in maintaining a rigorous standard for mandamus relief is the Christensen

court's discussion of the requisite finding of error justifying mandamus. The Ninth Circuit purported to grant mandamus only where the
court was "firmly convinced that [the] district court erred in deciding"
to disqualify the petitioner." However, it is not clear that "firmly convinced" implied anything more stringent than a finding of mere error.
The court never once mentions the district court's lack of reasonabil74
The district court in Dresser interpreted Texas Disciplinary Rule 1.06(b) such that disqualification was in order only when a law firm was representing opposing parties in "substantially related" litigations or when the firm's ability to represent its client will be in some other
manner "adversely limited" by representing the opposing party in an unrelated litigation. Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (1989), reprinted in Tex Gov Code Ann, title 2, subtitle G, appendix (Vernon Supp 1995). See also Dresser, 972 F2d at 542 (reviewing the district
court's determination). The Fifth Circuit, in reviewing Dresser's mandamus petition, instead
applied the national ethics standards (the ABA Model Rules, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers) that prohibit any representations
against current clients without their consent. See id at 543-45 (stating that a disqualification
motion in a "generic civil case" is "governed by the ethical rules announced by the national
profession in light of the public interest and the litigants' rights"). Note that the Fifth Circuit,
despite applying a de novo standard, inexplicably stated that the district court "clearly erred" in
solely applying local ethics rules. Id.
75 972 F2d 605 (5th Cir 1992).
76
Id at 609.
77 Id (holding that the "nature and size" of the litigation may preclude the petitioner from
getting adequate relief on direct appeal).
78
Id (holding as relevant the fact that the legal issues addressed in the underlying suit have
broader relevance), citing In re Burlington Northern, Inc, 822 F2d 518, 523 (5th Cir 1987). There
is some basis for this consideration in Supreme Court cases regarding advisory mandamus generally and in Judge McConnell's comment. See McConnell, Comment, 45 U Chi L Rev at 474-76
(cited in note 50) (collecting cases).
79 844 F2d 694 (9th Cir 1988).
80 Id at 697 ("Once a new attorney is brought in, the effect of the order is irreversible.").
81 Id, quoting In re Cement Antitrust Litigation,688 F2d 1297,1306-07 (9th Cir 1982).
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ity during its long and involved discussion of the appropriate legal
standard and how it should be applied.2
B.

Circuits That Tighten the Standard

Taking the approach opposite to the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the
First Circuit interprets the holdings of the Firestone trilogy such that
mandamus is inappropriate in the vast majority of cases and, in fact,
may never be justified in the attorney disqualification context. Indeed, the First Circuit appears to go beyond the Supreme Court, holding that "disqualification orders plainly do not meet the first of these
[mandamus] requirements," that the denial of interlocutory relief will
subject the petitioner to some kind of special, irreparable harm." Thus,
the First Circuit seems to foreclose the possibility of mandamus relief,
even in exceptional circumstances. Like the First Circuit, the Sixth
Circuit does not consider additional costs or delays imposed on a litigant as satisfying the requirements for mandamus relief.!
Though finding the lack of irreparable harm dispositive, the First
Circuit goes on to consider the second prong of the test, requiring that
the petitioner's right to relief be clearly established. In In re Bushkin
Associates, Inc,86 the court held that legal error sufficient to warrant
reversal on direct appeal may not rise to the level necessary to qualify
for mandamus relief. Even more menacing for those who seek mandamus relief from the First Circuit is the court's limited view of the
circumstances in which mandamus should issue generally. The court
requires that a lower court acted "clearly without jurisdiction ' ' " or that
it "abused its discretion to such an extreme and injurious degree that

82 Christensen, 844 F2d at 697-99 (determining that the "substantial relationship test,"
which "prohibits an attorney from undertaking representation of an adverse party that is 'substantially related' to the former representation," is inapplicable to the underlying situation in
which the district court disqualified counsel).
83 See Bushkin, 864 F2d at 243 (While the Firestonetrilogy does not "bar mandamus challenges to disqualification orders in so many words, their import is clear. The common strands
which weave their way through the KollerlFlanaganlRisjordtrilogy strongly suggest that, in the
great majority of instances, mandamus would be utterly inappropriate.").
84 Id at 243-44 (suggesting that the "incremental delay-cum-expense resulting from disqualification is insufficient to justify intermediate review").
85 See In re Mechem, 880 F2d 872,874 (6th Cir 1989), quoting Firestone,449 US at 377, for
the proposition that a disqualification order "will rarely, if ever, represent a final rejection of a
claim of fundamental right that cannot effectively be reviewed following judgment on the merits."
86 864 F2d 241 (1st Cir 1989).
87 Id at 245 (holding that even if the district court judge "miscalculated in extending [a
precedent] to the circumstances at bar ... a showing of legal error sufficient to win reversal on
direct appeal, without more, does not warrant resort to mandamus").
88 Id, quoting United States v Sorren, 605 F2d 1211,1215 (1st Cir 1979).

2005]

Mandamus Review of Attorney DisqualificationOrders

683

its actions comprise 'a judicial usurpation of power."' ' It thus appears
that the First Circuit's reluctance to employ mandamus in its advisory
function is responsible, at least in part, for its reticence in issuing the
writ in the attorney disqualification context."
Although the Tenth Circuit is sometimes listed with the First and
Sixth Circuits as maintaining a high threshold for the issuance of
mandamus in this context," that characterization of the Tenth Circuit's
approach may not be accurate. For example, the Tenth Circuit granted
mandamus relief in In re American Cable Publications,Inc ,2 conclud-

ing that the trial court had made an error of law in holding that a lawyer may not represent his law partner." Although the American Cable
Publications court admitted that a literal reading of the applicable
professional responsibility rules "plausibly support[ed] the trial court's
interpretation," the importance of the novel legal question at issue
and the lack of an alternative legal remedy provided the exceptional

circumstances required for the issuance of mandamus." While there is
a legal basis for considering the existence of a novel and important

issue of law in the decision to grant mandamus relief," the court
clearly employed mandamus in an advisory rather than a supervisory
manner.
C.

The Seventh Circuit's Middle Way

The Seventh Circuit, in its approach to mandamus review of attorney disqualification orders, has managed to sail between the Scylla
of de novo review that would effectively undermine the Supreme

Court's prohibition of interlocutory appeals in the Firestone trilogy
89
Bushkin, 864 F2d at 245-46 (holding that the choice of sanction is highly discretionary
and that "because the impost selected, though severe, was not so grossly disproportionate as to
vault the towering barrier blocking intermediate review of discretionary rulings, mandamus will
not lie"), citing Allied Chemical Corp v Daiflon,Inc, 449 US 33,35 (1980).
90 See Bushkin, 864 F2d at 247 (holding that "to entertain advisory mandamus in this instance would flout the well-reasoned jurisdictional curbs erected by the Koller/FlanaganlRisjord
trilogy"). For more on the debate over the use of mandamus, see generally Michael E. Solimine,
Revitalizing InterlocutoryAppeals in the Federal Courts, 58 Geo Wash L Rev 1165, 1165 (1990)
(arguing that "interlocutory appeals can and should play a greater role in the adjudicative process in the federal courts").
91 See, for example, In the Matter of Sandahl,980 F2d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir 1992) (identifying
the circuit split on this issue and listing the Tenth Circuit with the hard-liners).
92 768 F2d 1194 (10th Cir 1985).
93 Id at 1195 ("We treat this appeal as an application for a writ of mandamus because we
are convinced the trial court erroneously decided an important principle of law that affects not
just [the defendant] but all lawyer-litigants who choose to be represented by their law partners.").
94 Id at 1195-96 (referring to Colorado professional responsibility rules that address conflicts of interest).
95
See McConnell, Comment, 45 U Chi L Rev at 475-76 (cited in note 50) (collecting cases
that consider the novelty of a legal question in the decision to grant mandamus).
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and the Charybdis of standards so stringent that the result is great
injustice in more exceptional cases. The Seventh Circuit first laid out
its approach in In the Matter of Sandahl and then developed it in subsequent cases. Ultimately, the court achieved this balance, first, by requiring that a district court's ruling be "patently erroneous"' inorder
to warrant mandamus relief and, second, by recognizing irreparable
harm in a broader range of cases than would the First Circuit.
For example, the Seventh Circuit in In re Barnet 8 considered the
complexity of a case and the late stage of the litigation as suggesting
irreparable harm. The Barnett court's willingness to consider the
above as constituting irreparable harm results from the court's pragmatic acknowledgment that it would be "unrealistic" to imagine the
Seventh Circuit vacating a final judgment in such a case merely because some of the litigants had been improperly denied their counsel
of choice. '°° In order to justify what the First Circuit might criticize as a
downward departure from the Supreme Court's irreparable harm requirement in such instances, the Sandahl court points to examples
from the right to jury trials to the recusal of judges to demonstrate
that the irreparable harm requirement is not what it seems; courts
frequently water down this requirement.'' The Sandahl court also justifies this standard by pointing to two differences between the collateral order doctrine and mandamus: (1) whereas appeals under the
collateral order doctrine are as of right, jurisdiction under mandamus
is discretionary; and (2) while the standard of review under the collateral order doctrine is identical to the standard applied on direct appeal from a final judgment, the standard applied on mandamus is
more narrow."'" Because of these two differences, the court explains,
litigants have less of an incentive to petition for mandamus than they
had to appeal under the collateral order doctrine in the pre-Firestone
era.' 3 In essence, the difficulty of qualifying for mandamus and the
inherent risk in making the attempt (a party who fails ends up back in
front of the same district court judge) render mandamus self-policing.

96 980 F2d 1118 (7th Cir 1992).
97 Id at 1121.

97 F3d 181 (7th Cir 1996).
99 See id at 184 (holding the irreparable harm requirement satisfied where complex litigation has advanced to the remedies stage).
100 Id.
101 Sandahl,980 F2d at 1120 (describing the use of mandamus in situations "where irreparable harm could easily have been found wanting").
102 Id.
103 Id ("There is little danger to the courts of appeals of being flooded by petitions for
mandamus, and in fact such petitions are relatively infrequent.").
98
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More importantly, the Sandahl court identified the real dam that
keeps the flood of mandamus appeals at bay as not the irreparable
harm requirement, but rather the requirement that petitioners demonstrate a clear right to relief." As a result, the Sandahl court decried
the tendency of some circuit courts to apply the same standard of review in the attorney disqualification context to petitions for mandamus that is traditionally reserved for direct appeals from final judgments. 5 Instead, the Seventh Circuit sides with those courts that interpret the "clear right to relief' requirement to mean that the trial
court's disqualification order must be clearly erroneous.?° The Seventh
Circuit specifically criticizes the Fifth Circuit's practice of reviewing
°
de novo a trial court's decision of which ethical standard to apply.'
Despite this criticism, however, the Sandahl court forthrightly declared that mandamus should more readily issue where an order is
clearly wrong: "If the order is plainly wrong-if this is apparent without elaborate consideration of contested facts and legal principlesconsiderations of administrative efficiency argue for resort to mandamus as a swift and economical remedy against injustice."'"

Employing this reasoning in a subsequent case, the Barnett court
granted mandamus to reinstate attorneys who had been disqualified
for, among other things, criticizing a district court judge in public.'09
The basic framework that emerges from these cases sets a high
threshold for "clear right to relief' and then allows a degree of flexibility with respect to the irreparable harm requirement.

104

Id at 1121 (internal citation omitted):

If clear fight to relief-the existence of a demonstrable injustice-is allowed to slide into
mere right to relief, on the theory that disqualification cases usually turn on the interpretation of ethical standards rather than disputed facts and hence raise "legal" issues on which
appellate courts do not defer to trial courts, mandamus will provide a route of appellate review functionally identical to the direct appeal of disqualification orders.
105 Id at 1119 (criticizing the standard of review employed by some circuits as being "functionally identical to [the standard used on] the direct appeal of disqualification orders").
106 Id at 1121 (agreeing with the First, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits that a litigant appealing a
disqualification order must cross a higher threshold, showing that the order was "patently erroneous").
107 Id (disagreeing with, among other decisions, the Fifth Circuit's decision in American
Airlines, which, according to the Seventh Circuit, subscribes to the theory that "disqualification
cases usually turn on the interpretation of ethical standards ... and hence raise 'legal' issues").
108 Id at 1120.
109 See Barnett,97 F3d at 184 (finding "no basis in law" for any of the district court judge's
justifications for the disqualifications). As this case involved a redistricting question, the court
recognized the public importance of the final disposition as factoring into the mandamus analysis. Id (noting that the "larger public interest at stake ... would be disserved by the consequent
delay"). In this respect, the Seventh Circuit approach looks a bit more like the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits' multifactored analysis.
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A few years later, in In re Lewis,"' the court dismissed the peti-

tioners' arguments about increased litigation costs, damage to their
attorneys' reputations, and the risk that prevailing with new counsel
will render an erroneous disqualification order harmless as constituting irreparable harm.' The Lewis court allowed, however, that irreparable harm may exist if the petitioners lose on the merits with new
counsel and yet are unable to establish that they would have prevailed

had their original attorneys not been disqualifiedY.
The Lewis court acknowledged that to carry this argument too far
would undermine Koller, echoing the Sandahl court's conclusion that
the only way to keep mandamus from effectively overturning Koller is
to allow mandamus relief only in cases of clear error. "3 The Lewis

court noted that the two prior attorney disqualification cases where
the Seventh Circuit issued mandamus involved "obvious blunders by
the district courts, blunders that imposed pointless costs on litigants.""
Analogizing to the calculus employed by district courts in deciding
whether to grant preliminary injunctions, the Lewis court suggested
that courts utilize a similar balancing test in determining whether to
grant mandamus relief in the attorney disqualification context."' In
effect, courts balance the costs of wrongly issuing mandamus against
the costs to the petitioner of denying mandamus."6 This would be a
significant departure from the Sandahl-Barnettframework were it not
that the Lewis court retained the high threshold requirement of a
clear right to relief established in the earlier decisions and only accepted lesser showings of irreparable harm where they were balanced
by a showing of clear right to relief that exceeded the threshold."7
The Seventh Circuit approach therefore requires that a certain
threshold be met with respect to the clarity of the error while the degree of irreparable harm required varies with the degree to which the
110 212 F3d 980 (7th Cir 2000).
111 Id at 983-84.
112 Id at 984 (explaining that "this injury will be impossible to establish because it is so hard
to evaluate the benefits of legal expertise and know, even in retrospect, the destinations of paths
untaken").
113 Id (noting that Sandahl "accordingly concluded that only'patently erroneous' disqualification orders may be undone by mandamus").
114 Id at 984-85.
115 Id at 984 ("Just as a judge asked to issue a preliminary injunction must balance the costs
of error ... so a court of appeals must balance error costs.").
116 Id. The analogy to preliminary injunction balancing is inapt to some extent, but the
balancing of error costs involved in the decision to grant mandamus is at least comparable.
117 Id ("A shortfall in the predicted size of irreparable injury may be overcome by a substantial likelihood of error-for if the district judge has committed an obvious blunder, then
immediate correction benefits both sides, without undermining application of the final-decision
rule for closer cases.").
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clarity of the error surpasses this threshold. That is, an elevated showing of a right to relief can make up for a lesser showing of irreparable
harm (though the converse is not true). Of course, while this approach
is superior to those taken by the other courts of appeals, it could be
improved in important ways.
III. A BALANCED APPROACH

This Part recommends a new approach, termed the "balanced"
approach, which is essentially a modified version of the Seventh Circuit approach. Like the Seventh Circuit approach, the balanced approach would retain a high threshold for right to relief and deemphasize irreparable harm. 8 However, the balanced approach is superior
to the Seventh Circuit approach in that it accounts for the differences
between orders granting disqualification motions and those denying
such motions.
Courts can more easily address a refusal to disqualify an attorney
where disqualification is warranted on appeal from a final judgment
than an order disqualifying an attorney when disqualification is not
warranted. For example, a refusal to disqualify that results in the passage of sensitive information from the offending attorney to his client
will more likely reveal demonstrable injury. On the other hand, if the
client of a disqualified attorney loses on the merits with new counsel, it
is virtually impossible to establish that the party would have prevailed
with his original counsel. As the Lewis court explained, this "[r]eal but
hard-to-quantify loss is a standard form of irreparable injury....9
In addition, insofar as one disapproves of the theoretical underpinnings of much of the substantive law of attorney disqualification, it
is easier to see injury flowing from the disqualification of attorneys

than from the failure to disqualify attorneys. As such, irreparable
harm should be presumed when a party seeks mandamus relief from
an order granting disqualification, while irreparable harm should
rarely be found from an order refusing to disqualify. This flexible approach will allow interlocutory appeals in those cases in which the
district court orders are most likely wrong while preserving the effi118 Although completely eliminating the irreparable harm requirement in this context does
not appear permissible under current Supreme Court doctrifi,,
a broad array of cases in the
circuit courts and the Supreme Court seem to contemplate a high degree of flexibility with respect to the requirement of irreparable harm in several categories of cases. See note 50 and
accompanying text. See also Sandahl, 980 F2d at 1120 (noting that "the history and usages of
mandamus" demonstrate that it "has been deployed flexibly in cases where irreparable harm
could easily have been found wanting-notably cases in which the writ is used to enforce the
right to a jury trial"). It therefore seems acceptable to deemphasize the irreparable harm requirement in the attorney disqualification context.
119 212 F3d at 984.
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ciencies secured through application of the final judgment rule in
those cases in which some doubt exists as to the proper legal outcome.
As such, application of the probabilistic approach to mandamus review
of attorney disqualification orders should increase net social welfare.
A. Efficiency and Justice Justifications
The balanced approach is an improvement over the First and
Sixth Circuit approaches from an efficiency perspective. If the threshold for clear error is high enough, then mandamus will issue only in
those cases where appellate courts almost certainly would have vacated any final judgment.n The greater the amount of resources involved (as where litigation is very complex or where a case is at a very
advanced stage), the greater the cost to society of failing to issue a
writ of mandamus where a disqualification order was erroneously issued. Moreover, even where the petitioner has a very strong case on
the merits, an erroneous disqualification order will increase the settlement value for the other party by an amount up to the cost of
bringing new counsel up to speed; this creates yet another ex ante incentive for parties to bring disqualification motions. The balanced approach responds to these concerns.
Even if the de novo review practiced by those circuits that relax
the standard for mandamus relief reduces net error costs and yields
efficiency gains, this would not justify broad circumvention of the final
judgment rule. However, because the threshold standard for mandamus relief is very high under the balanced approach, few cases will
qualify, resulting in little evasion of the rule. This is important because
while greater interlocutory review of trial court decisions would allow
for more prompt error correction, "Congress has expressed a preference that some erroneous trial court rulings go uncorrected until the
appeal of a final judgment, rather than having litigation punctuated by
'piecemeal appellate review of trial court decisions which do not terminate the litigation. ' "' ' 2 '
Even more compelling than any efficiency gains resulting from
the balanced approach is the fact that this approach alleviates the
burden on parties who are subject to the greatest injustice from patently erroneous disqualification orders. Parties that suffer a significant
delay or added expense become victims of injustice to the extent that
120 One problem here, however, is that in those cases in which the petitioner would have
prevailed anyway, the erroneous disqualification order is harmless error. Likewise, mandamus
will result in efficiency gains only in those cases in which the petitioner does not prevail if the
appellate courts do not require a showing of prejudice on appeals from final judgments.
121 Koller, 472 US at 430, citing United States v Hollywood Motor Car Co, 458 US 263,265
(1982).
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such delay or expense forces (1) plaintiffs to abandon their suits entirely, or (2) defendants to settle for higher amounts than would have
been otherwise required. The Supreme Court left open the mandamus
route to interlocutory review of attorney disqualification orders, and
we must assume that it did so for a reason: to provide a pressure release valve for situations in which its holdings in the Firestone trilogy
would result in great injustice.
Indeed, while the final judgment rule can perhaps be justified on
efficiency grounds, ' both Congress... and the judiciary ' have recognized the need for exceptions in certain circumstances. Mandamus,
though not created in response to similar concerns, has been flexibly
applied in circumstances that warrant interlocutory relief but where
statutory and judicially-created exceptions leave a gap. Such is the
case where a heavy burden falls on a litigant, a burden that is not justified by any uncertainty as to the proper legal outcome.
B.

The Balanced Approach and Supreme Court Precedent

The efficiency gains and even the justice rationale for the balanced approach cannot justify erosion of Supreme Court precedent by
the circuit courts. Therefore, it is necessary to confirm that this approach comports with the holdings of the Firestone trilogy. The Supreme Court does not recognize increased litigation expenses or delay
as a basis for finding that an order is effectively unreviewable upon
final judgment.12' However, as discussed above, this does not necessar122 The Court has defended the final judgment rule, claiming that it "promotes efficient
judicial administration while at the same time emphasizing the deference appellate courts owe to
the district judge's decisions on the many questions of law and fact that arise before judgment."
Koller, 472 US at 430, citing Firestone,449 US at 374, and Flanagan,465 US at 263-64. Although
"[t]here is general agreement that, on balance, the policies underlying the final judgment rule
justify the costs it may impose in most cases," Timothy . Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion:
Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 Notre Dame L Rev 175, 185 (2001), some commentators nevertheless argue for a variety of exceptions to the rule where the costs presumably
outweigh the benefits. See, for example, Jordon L. Kruse, Comment, Appealability of Class Certification Orders:The "MandamusAppeal" and a Proposalto Amend Rule 23,91 Nw U L Rev 704,
705 (1997) (proposing "an amendment to Rule 23 which would provide limited interlocutory
review of class certification orders"); Michael J. Davidson, A Modest Proposal:PermitInterlocutory Appeals of Summary Judgment Denials, 147 Milit L Rev 145, 152 (1995) (arguing that "interlocutory appeal [should] be permitted in those limited situations when an appellate court's potential reversal of a district court's order denying summary judgment, pursuant to FRCP 56,
would effectively terminate the litigation").
123 See 28 USC § 1292 (setting out circumstances in which appellate courts have jurisdiction
over interlocutory appeals).
124 See note 8.
125 See Koller, 472 US at 434 ("We do not think that the delay resulting from the occasionally erroneous disqualification outweighs the delay that would result from allowing piecemeal
appeal of every order disqualifying counsel."). See also id at 436 ("If the expense of litigation
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ily imply that such considerations cannot, in extreme circumstances,
warrant a finding of irreparable harm in the mandamus context. Indeed, mandamus has repeatedly been used as a means of last resort to
avoid unjust ends."6

The approach of those circuits that harden the standard for mandamus implies that no set of circumstances in the attorney disqualification context will satisfy the Supreme Court's irreparable harm requirement for mandamus relief.'2 However, the Court clearly indicated that in a certain narrow set of circumstances such relief may be
available1 n This apparent conflict suggests either that the Supreme
Court has effectively contradicted itself or that those circuits that
tighten the standard for mandamus relief have interpreted the mandamus standard too strictly.
Finally, one court that tightens the standard for mandamus relief,
the First Circuit, suggests that mandamus is generally inappropriate
when applied to exercises of judicial discretion."9 However, the appellate courts arguably have jurisdiction to issue the writ in such circumstances both in their supervisory and advisory capacities. ' Thus, the
Court can be understood to have held in La Buy v Howes Leather
Co'"' that the use of mandamus is appropriate to correct "gross abuses
of judicial discretion.' 32 More importantly, the Supreme Court decisions regarding the appropriate use of mandamus "are better viewed
not as doctrinal pronouncements but as examples of a pragmatic approach in action.'. Indeed, Justice Kennedy alludes to this pragmatic
County.'1
approach in his concurrence in Cunningham v Hamilton
were a sufficient reason for granting an exception to the final judgment rule, the exception might
well swallow the rule."), quoting Lusardi v Xerox Corp, 747 F2d 174,178 (3d Cir 1984).
126 See Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Cunningham v Hamilton County, where he
stated that mandamus may be justified to avoid "an exceptional hardship itself likely to cause an
injustice." 527 US 198,211 (1999).
127 See Bushkin, 864 F2d at 243 (interpreting the "Supreme Court's formulation of the
appealability equation" to mean that disqualification orders "plainly do not meet" the irreparable harm requirement).
128 See Firestone, 449 US at 378-79 n 13 (noting that in "exceptional circumstances" a litigant who is "absolutely determined that it will be harmed irreparably" might possibly resort to a
writ of mandamus).
129 See Bushkin, 864 F2d at 245 (calling mandamus "an inappropriate prism through which
to inspect exercises of judicial discretion").
130 See La Buy v Howes Leather Co, 352 US 249, 256 (1957) (endorsing the exercise of
supervisory mandamus jurisdiction where a district court has made an arguably discretionary
decision to refer a case to a special master).
131 352 US 249 (1957).
132 McConnell, Comment, 45 U Chi L Rev at 477 (cited in note 50).
133 Id at 478.
134 527 US 198,211 (1999) (Kennedy concurring) (explaining that an attorney sanctioned by
the district court "is not without remedy" but can petition for a writ of mandamus where the
result is "an exceptional hardship itself likely to cause an injustice").
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C. Lack of Uniform Standards
The Firestone trilogy has ushered in a period in which district
courts have been almost entirely without guidance from appellate
courts with regard to what substantive standards they should apply in
assessing motions to disqualify attorneys. The lack of uniformity even
across courts within the same circuit has created notice problems and
increased uncertainty costs for potential litigants. While mandamus
review may help at the margins (the courts can at least point out particularly egregious departures from the appropriate standards), this
does not create uniformity.
In spite of the problems associated with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' approach, requiring mere error with respect to questions of law
and allowing that substantial costs (in the case of the Fifth Circuit) or
the inability to be represented by one's counsel of choice (in the case
of the Ninth) may satisfy the irreparable harm requirement, this approach certainly has its advantages. In a world where the absence of
interlocutory review of disqualification orders as of right usually results in no review at all, looser standards for mandamus relief may
help the appellate courts ensure somewhat uniform standards in the
administration of attorney disqualification law. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit may be doing exactly this."' Relaxing the requirements for the
issuance of mandamus, however, seems a questionable means of effecting the goal of uniformity. Instead, the following mechanisms, coupled with the balanced approach to mandamus review, may alleviate
some of the consistency problems that exist under the current regime.
1. Giving disqualified attorneys standing.
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, in certain circumstances, provide disqualified attorneys standing to sue based on reputational
harm." The Tenth Circuit recognizes standing in such suits after final
judgment even if the client has settled the case or is otherwise uninterested in appeal." The Eleventh Circuit requires that the attorney
135 See generally Schneyer, 16 Rev Litig 537 (cited in note 31) (criticizing the Fifth Circuit's
imposition through mandamus of national ethical standards rather than allowing district courts
in Texas to apply state conflicts standards). Also note that in both Dresserand American Airlines,
the Fifth Circuit issued writs of mandamus reversing the lower courts' denial of disqualification.
Dresser,972 F2d at 541; American Airlines, 972 F2d at 607. These actions are consistent with the Fifth
Circuit's preference that the district courts in that circuit employ stricter conflicts requirements.
136 See, for example, Weeks v Independent School District, 230 F3d 1201, 1207 (10th Cir
2000) (holding that a disqualified attorney had standing to appeal the disqualification order
because "a favorable court decision would ...help ameliorate the damage to [the attorney's]
professional reputation from the sanction order").
137 See, for example, Johnson v Board of County Commissioners, 85 F3d 489, 492 (10th Cir
1996) ("[Slettlement of an underlying case does not preclude appellate review of an order dis-
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have been disqualified based on allegations of misconduct in order to
have standing.u Otherwise, these courts hold, there is no reputational
harm to redress. This requirement severely limits the utility of this
approach because a large proportion of disqualification orders stem
from conflicts of interest rather than actual misconduct.' If courts
adopt a broader conception of reputational harm, however, this
mechanism may provide for enough appellate review to achieve uniform standards. For example, a law firm that has been disqualified because of an undetected conflict of interest, or because its precautions
to avoid the intermingling of confidential client information and thus
the harm from such conflicts were considered inadequate, suffers reputational harm because potential clients may see the firm as incompetent in this respect. If courts recognize an attorney's standing on the
basis of this harm, the courts will likely have many cases in which to
craft the substantive law of attorney disqualification.
2. National standards for attorney disqualification.
The adoption by the judicial conference of a body of federal rules
governing attorney conduct and disqualification in federal courts has
also been proposed as a means of creating uniformity in the substantive law of attorney disqualification. Although this proposal was not
taken up at the most recent judicial conference, a report prepared for
that conference describes how the proposed standards would work.'
Of course, this does not solve the problem of lack of review; it is possible that the various district courts will adopt conflicting interpretations of such rules. Nevertheless, such a uniform, coherent set of rules
would undoubtedly be an improvement over a system in which it is
not even clear which ethical rules apply. This would have the addiqualifying an attorney from further representation insofar as that order rests on grounds that
could harm his or her professional reputation.").
138 See, for example, Kirkland v National Mortgage Network, Inc, 884 F2d 1367, 1370 (11th
Cir 1989) (finding relevant the potential negative and lasting consequences that a disqualification order, invoked on grounds of misconduct, could have on the attorney's career).
139 See Green, 65 Fordham L Rev at 71 n 4 (cited in note 23) (discussing a study finding that
"out of 443 reported federal decisions involving attorney conduct over a five-year period, 46%
involved conflict-of-interest rules").
140 Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct, Draft Rule 1, reprinted in 16 ABAIBNA Lawyers'
Manual on Professional Conduct: Current Reports No 6 158 (2000) (setting forth several alternative models of a proposed Federal Rule of Attorney Conduct 1). See also McMorrow and Coquillette, Moore's FederalPractice § 802.23 at 802-79 to 802-80 (cited in note 20) (discussing the
proposed Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct).
141 See Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in
FederalCourt and How Should the Rules Be Created?,64 Geo Wash L Rev 460 (1996) (proposing and defending detailed rulemaking by the federal judiciary). But see Note, Uniform Federal
Rules of Attorney Conduct:A Flawed Proposal,111 Harv L Rev 2063, 2064 (1998) (arguing that
defer to state definitions of ethical attorney conduct" since "[f]or many
"federal courts should ...
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tional benefit of making decisions to disqualify attorneys less discretionary because judges would no longer have multiple sources from
which to choose the law they will apply, and issuing mandamus in such
cases would appear less objectionable.
CONCLUSION

One might worry that a lower standard for mandamus to issue in
the attorney disqualification context will cause the appellate courts to
be inundated with a barrage of mandamus petitions.' However, this
has not been the experience in the Seventh Circuit, where only three
such petitions were heard during the 1990s. The nature of mandamus
itself helps to control this threat. District court judges often see mandamus petitions as a slap in the face, and a party will be concerned
that he may end up back in front of the same judge at some future
date. Likewise, the disqualified attorney may be concerned that she
will have to appear before that judge in future cases. Therefore, petitioners will seek mandamus relief only in the most egregious of circumstances. The balanced approach is the best way for the courts to
achieve the finality goals outlined by the Supreme Court in the Firestone trilogy without sacrificing judicial economy or justice for the
parties.

lawyers, the attorney-client relationship exists prior to and independent of litigation in the federal courts").
142 See Koller, 472 US at 434 (voicing such a concern).

